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Abstract
Background: ‘An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure’ is a common saying, and indeed, most health
economic studies conclude that people are more willing to pay for preventive measures than for treatment activities.
This may be because most health economic studies ask respondents to compare preventive measures with treatment,
and thus prompt respondents to consider other uses of resources. However, psychological theorizing suggests that,
when methods do not challenge subjects to consider other uses of resources, curative treatment is favored over
prevention. Could it be that while prevention is praised, cure is preferred?
Methods: In two experimental studies, we investigated, from a psychological perspective and using a between-
subjects design, whether prevention or treatment is preferred and why. In both studies, participants first read a
lung cancer prevention or treatment intervention scenario that varied on the prevention-treatment dimension,
but that were the same on factors like ‘costs per saved life’ and kind of disease. Then participants completed a
survey measuring appreciation (general and monetary) as well as a number of potential mediating variables.
Results: Both studies clearly demonstrated that, when the design was between-subjects, participants had greater
(general and monetary) appreciation for treatment interventions than for preventive interventions with perceived
urgency of the intervention quite consistently mediating this effect. Differences in appreciation of treatment over
preventive treatment were shown to be .59 (Study 1) and .45 (Study 2) on a 5-point scale. Furthermore, participants
thought that health insurance should compensate more for the treatment than for preventive measures, differences of
16% (Study 1), and 22% (Study 2). When participants were asked to directly compare both interventions on the basis of
a short description, they preferred the preventive intervention.
Conclusion: It appears that people claim to prefer prevention when they are asked to consider other use of resources,
but otherwise they prefer treatment. This preference is related to perceived urgency. The preference for treatment
may be related to the prevention-treatment dimension itself, but also to variations on other dimensions that are
inherently linked to prevention and treatment (like different efficacy rates and costs per treatment).
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Background
‘It is better to prevent than to cure’ is an old adage that
reaches as far back as Hippocrates in Ancient Greece.
This preference for prevention over treatment ensues from
the idea that small preventive efforts can substantially
decrease, or altogether remove, substantial negative future
outcomes. This belief is not only held by lay people but by
professionals as well. In fact, the National Institute for
Public Health and the Environment in the Netherlands
claims that, in many cases, preventive efforts can lead
to great health benefits at only a small expense [1]. This
praise in favor of prevention would suggest that preven-
tion is preferred over treatment. However, the allocation
of government funds suggests otherwise (although this
admittedly is a very rough measure). In the Netherlands, a
mere 5% of the health care budget is spent on prevention
while about 40% is spent on curative measures [1]. Studies
in the United States show comparable figures [2,3] despite
U.S. citizens believing that the greater share of health
spending should be earmarked for prevention rather
than treatment of disease (1999 Harris Poll, as cited in
Corso et al. [4]). This leads us to ask whether it is pos-
sible that although prevention is praised, treatment is
actually preferred? Most studies comparing preferences
for prevention or treatment use economic paradigms in
which, for example, ‘willingness to pay’ is assessed via (in-
direct) bidding games, trade-off questions, or discrete
choice experiments. These studies indeed show a pref-
erence for prevention over treatment and, occasionally,
an equally strong preference for prevention and treat-
ment [5-10]. In almost all such studies, participants are
asked to directly compare prevention to treatment pro-
grams or life-saving means [5-7,9,10] or the researchers
go to great lengths to teach participants in tutorials to
assess programs and consider other use of resources
[8]. In either condition, respondents are triggered to
assess programs objectively, and in doing so, they tend
to show a preference for prevention because quality of
life is often considered inferior after treatment.
However, in a study conducted by Corso et al. [4],
participants were asked to indicate their willingness to
pay for either a treatment intervention or a preventive
intervention (both for food-borne illness with an identical
reduction in mortality risk). They were not asked to
compare the interventions. The results showed that
respondents were far more willing to pay for treatment
than for prevention. Later, Corso [11] reported data
derived from an extra question completed by these
same participants whereby they were asked to directly
choose between a preventive or treatment intervention
that were equal in terms of costs and lives saved.
Interestingly, when asked to compare the two, more
than 70% of the participants opted for the preventive
program. Corso et al. [11] do not give explicit explanations
for the observed difference between methods, although
the study design is mentioned as a factor of possible
influence (cf. [12]).
Evidently, in health economic studies, focus is primarily
placed on what people choose when they are asked to
compare the relevant facts of more interventions. In such
a situation, people may see the advantages of prevention
more clearly, and show a preference for prevention over
treatment.
However, in everyday life, people usually hear about
one intervention at a time and assessments may be less
objective, and this is not only the case for lay people
but also for policymakers. When the general public and
policymakers would have a preference for cure in these
everyday situations, this might have far-reaching conse-
quences for policy decisions, because policymakers may
be guided by their own as well as the general public’s
subjective appreciations (i.e. the public opinion). With
this in mind, we decided to, in the present study, focus
on people’s appreciation for prevention and treatment
when they are not asked to compare the two but rather
judge one or the other independently. We believe that
when asked to judge prevention or treatment independ-
ently, a number of psychological mechanisms may lead
to a preference for treatment over prevention.
Psychological mechanisms that may affect preferences for
treatment and prevention
First, the time interval required for benefits to be seen
may play a role. In prevention, positive outcomes tend
to be long term outcomes, whereas with treatment, the
positive results are often evident in the short term. Re-
search shows that health gains that occur immediately
are preferred over delayed health gains [13], cf. ‘discount-
ing’ [14,15]. It is thus plausible that treatment, with its
short term results, is preferred over prevention with its
long term payoff, and therefore leads to a higher measured
appreciation.
Second, the certainty of the cause and effect can impact
evaluations of prevention and treatment. Kahneman and
Tversky [16] showed that people prefer a certain positive
outcome (e.g. a sure gain of 240 dollars) over a less certain
but even more positive outcome (e.g. 25% chance to gain
1000 dollars). The link between a treatment intervention
and a positive outcome tends to be more evident than the
relationship between a preventive activity and its positive
health outcome, even if that outcome is more beneficial.
As such, a more certain treatment may be valued more
than uncertain prevention, and therefore may lead to a
higher measured preference.
Third, the urgency of an intervention is another factor
to be considered. This is influenced by the degree to which
the need for intervention is tangible. With prevention,
positive outcomes tend to only be evident at a collective
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level, whereas with treatment, success can be seen at
the individual level. Because people are generally more
willing to spend resources to save the life of identifiable
individuals [17-21], they are probably also more likely to
value programs that help identifiable people (i.e., treat-
ment programs) rather than programs that help people
that are merely represented by statistics (i.e., preventive
programs). Treatment activities are therefore likely to
be considered more necessary than preventive activities,
especially given that bad health outcomes are usually
inevitable when a person is in need of treatment [17].
This is not the case with preventive activities. In fact, at
the individual level, it is impossible to predict the future
development of a given health problem for which prevent-
ive activities are in place. Preventive activities may therefore
seem less urgent than treatment interventions, and there-
fore may lead to less measured appreciation.
Fourth, the proportion of the reference group that can
be ‘saved’ is greater in treatment programs than it is in
prevention programs. In preventive interventions, usually
more individuals are treated ‘in vain’ than in treatment
interventions, as the number of people at risk for a disease
is higher than the number of people who actually get the
disease. This means that for more people the preventive
intervention is a waste of time [17]. This too may lead
to a preference for, and a higher measured appreciation
of treatment over prevention.
Other psychological factors may play a role in prefer-
ences for health and disease related interventions, like
the responsibility of the patient for the illness [7],
whether the outcome is achieved actively or passively
[22,23], or whether the diagnosis is benign vs. malign
[23], but these factors are not consistently linked to the
prevention-treatment dimension.
In short, the time interval required to demonstrate
positive effects, the certainty with which the positive
outcome can be attributed to the intervention, the
extent to which the intervention is considered urgent,
and the proportion of the reference group that profits
from the intervention are all attributes that play a role
in the desirability or appreciation of preventive and
treatment interventions, and that may result in greater
appreciation for activities that seek to treat rather than
prevent disease. At the same time, the expected quality
of life that results from an intervention is likely to be
higher after preventive activities than after treatment
activities [18]. This would suggest that prevention is
valued more. According to Hsee [12] attributes that are
difficult to evaluate on desirability have lower impact
on preferences in separate evaluations than attributes
that are easier to evaluate. We expect time interval,
certainty, proportion and especially urgency to be attri-
butes of the intervention that may be easier to evaluate
than quality of life. Therefore, we expect that ‘quality of
life’ does not affect preference in a separate evaluation
as strong as easy to evaluate attributes like ‘urgency’. So,
we expect that the psychological mechanisms described
above generate a greater appreciation for treatment than
for prevention but that this preference is only manifest
when people do not have to compare prevention to treat-
ment intervention and are not otherwise challenged to
consider other use of resources. In the studies reported in
this paper, we investigate if this is indeed the case and
attempt to establish whether the proposed psychological
mechanisms contribute to the hypothesized preference for
treatment over prevention.
Study 1
Methods
Participants and design
The research design for this study was a between-subjects
design with two different scenario conditions, namely a
‘treatment condition’ and a ‘prevention condition’. Back-
ground characteristics of the participants are described
in Table 1. Chi-square tests and a t-test (age) showed
that there were no significant differences in background
characteristics of participants between the prevention
and the treatment condition (all p’s > .50).
Procedure
Data were derived from a convenience sample of train
passengers traveling in the Netherlands. All available
passengers in a given compartment were approached for
participation and told that this study sought to assess
appreciation for new developments in health care, that
participation entailed completing the questionnaire that
would take 10 to 15 minutes, and that they would receive a
chocolate bar as a token of appreciation after completion.
Potential participants were also informed that they could
stop their participation in the study any time, and that they
could decide not to give the researcher their questionnaire
if they had any objections to what was asked of them. Only
about a fifth of the train passengers declined participation.
Participants who agreed to participate were randomly
assigned to one of the two experimental conditions
whereby they read a scenario and completed a question-
naire. The researchers stayed in the compartment while
participants read the scenarios and completed their ques-
tionnaires in order to prevent people from consulting with
one another. According to Dutch law, this type of question-
naire study is exempt from ethics approval. Prior to data
acquisition, we pretested the questionnaires and scenarios
with a pilot group of more than 50 people and small adap-
tations were made based on the outcomes of this pretest.
Scenarios
Participants first read a short introduction: ‘In the fol-
lowing text, a description is given of a person active in
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the field of healthcare. Although the person does not exist
in real life, this story is quite realistic. Imagine the
situation as best as possible.’ A short scenario about a
professor who developed a revolutionary anti-smoking
intervention (in the prevention scenario) or a new surgical
technique for people suffering from lung cancer (in the
treatment scenario) then followed. Aside from this vari-
ation, the scenarios were kept as similar as possible (see
Prevention and treatment scenario for both scenarios).
Prevention and treatment scenario
Prevention scenario
Under the direction of Professor Lytgens, professor in
the field of preventive health care, a new revolutionary
method has been developed to help people quit smoking.
It concerns a course in which smokers receive an intensive
training provided by a number of Professor Lytgens’ assis-
tants over a period of two months. These assistants were
trained by Professor Lytgens for half a year before being
allowed to facilitate the course.
Smoking is the main cause of lung cancer. In fact, of
all cases of lung cancer in the Netherlands, 90% is
attributable to smoking. Less than 1% of non-smokers
die because of lung cancer. The results of well-designed
scientific research studies show that for every 1000 people
that participate in the course, 300 stop smoking because
of this course. This means that 25 people that would
otherwise have died as a result of lung cancer do not. In
other words, one in every 40 people that takes this course
is saved. The course costs 375 euros per participant so the
costs of a life saved are (40x375=) 15.000 euros (as for
every 40 people, for which the costs are 375 euros per
person, one life is saved)’.
Treatment scenario.
Under the direction of Professor Lytgens, professor in
the field of pulmonology (lung sciences), a new revolution-
ary method has been developed whereby people suffering
from lung cancer receive an operation that may success-
fully cure their cancer. Before then, an operation was
pointless and these people could not be helped.
Smoking is the main cause of lung cancer. In fact, of
all cases of lung cancer in the Netherlands, 90% is at-
tributable to smoking. Less than 1% of non-smokers die
because of lung cancer. The results of well-designed
scientific research studies show that for every 100 lung
cancer patients that would have otherwise died, 25 can
be saved with the new operation. These people can live
for many years in reasonably good health. In other words,
one out of every four operations results in cure. Each
operation costs 3750 euros so the costs of a life saved are
(4x3750=) 15.000 euros (as for every four operations, each
of which costs 3750 euros, one life is saved)’.
Questionnaires
After reading the prevention or treatment scenario, partici-
pants completed measures assessing general and monetary
appreciation for the (prevention or treatment) intervention
and the professor. Appreciation in this study is defined
as the ‘understanding of the nature or meaning or quality
or magnitude of something’ (www.vocabulary.com). Gen-
eral appreciation was measured by eight items, monetary
appreciation was measured by five items (see Concepts
and corresponding questionnaire items). Participants were
subsequently asked to directly compare the operation to
the quitting smoking course with a simple question (see
Concepts and corresponding questionnaire items ‘Com-
parison between preventive and treatment intervention’).
Measures representing concepts that may explain possible
differences in appreciation between prevention and treat-
ment (explanatory variables) were completed thereafter.
Also, a control question that checked for differences
between conditions in the degree to which the scenarios
were considered to reflect real life situations (realism of
scenario) was included. Lastly, we measured demographic
characteristics. Concepts and corresponding questionnaire
items shows the concepts measured, the items included
in the questionnaire, and Cronbach’s alphas for the scales
used. The Cronbach’s alphas for the monetary appreciation,
certainty of attribution, and urgency scales were low (.19, .52,
and .51, respectively). Low Cronbach’s alphas indicate that
items measure (slightly) different constructs. So, conse-
quently, single items were analyzed. For the General Appre-
ciation scale, that had a sufficient to good Cronbach’s alpha,
a mean score was computed (after recoding the items to
5-point scales when necessary).
Table 1 Participant characteristics
Gender (n) Education (n) Smoking status (n) Age (M)
Male Female High Medium Low Non-smoker Quit smoking Smoker
Study 1 (n = 82) Prevention scenario (n = 43) 14 28 29 10 3 31 4 6 30.7
Treatment scenario (n = 39) 15 22 29 6 2 26 5 7 31.1
Study 2 (n = 122) Prevention scenario (n = 43) 21 19 30 9 2 25 10 6 39.6
Treatment scenario (n = 79) 26 45 64 6 2 48 11 12 41.3
Note: Due to missing values n’s do not always sum up to totals.
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Concepts and corresponding questionnaire items
General appreciation (Cronbach’s alpha Study 1: .73;
Study 2: .82)
– How great is your appreciation for Professor Lytgens
who developed the new quitting smoking course/
[anti-smoking pill]/operation? 1 = very low,
10 = very high
– To what extent do you appreciate Professor Lytgens’
achievement? 1 = very little, 10 = very much
– Professor Lytgens should be awarded the Nobel
Prize for developing the new quitting smoking
course/[anti-smoking pill]/operation. 1 = disagree,
5 = completely agree
– Professor Lytgens should get a pay raise for
developing the quitting smoking course/[anti-smoking
pill]/operation. 1 = disagree, 5 = completely agree
– Professor Lytgens should get a promotion at work
for developing the new quitting smoking course/
[anti-smoking pill]/operation. 1 = disagree,
5 = completely agree
– Professor Lytgens should receive attention from the
media for developing the new quitting smoking
course/[anti-smoking pill]/operation. 1 = disagree,
5 = completely agree
– The new quitting smoking course/[anti-smoking
pill]/operation should be prescribed internationally.
1 = disagree, 5 = completely agree
– What grade would you give Professor Lytgens for
his new quitting smoking course/[anti-smoking pill]/
operation? 1 = very bad, 10 = very good
Monetary appreciation
– If a collection were to be held for work similar to
that of Professor Lytgens, would you donate and, if
so, how much? (Please note: We will not ask you for
money) No, Yes, …. euro
– What percentage of the costs of Professor Lytgens
new quitting smoking course/[anti-smoking pill]/
operation should be covered by health insurance?
0% - 10%- 20%........80% - 90% - 100%
– If you could decide how health insurance funds are
spent, would you give more money to Professor
Lytgens’ quitting smoking course/[anti-smoking
pill]/operation or to increasing personal attention to
patients with incurable diseases in nursing homes?
1 = spend more money on the quitting smoking
course/anti-smoking pill/operation, 5 = spend more
money on nursing homes
– If you could decide how health insurance funds are
spent, would you give more money to Professor
Lytgens’ new quitting smoking course/[anti-smoking
pill]/operation or to broadcasting public service
announcements (PSAs) on TV that warn people
against the dangers of smoking? 1 = spend more
money on the quitting smoking course/anti-smoking
pill/operation, 5 = spend more money on PSAs
– If you could decide how health insurance funds
are spent, would you give more money to
Professor Lytgens’ new quitting smoking
course/[anti-smoking pill]/operation or to
school-based alcohol abuse prevention activities
for young people? 1 = spend more money on
the quitting smoking course/anti-smoking pill/
operation, 5 = spend more money on
alcohol prevention
Comparison between preventive and treatment
intervention
– If you could decide how health insurance funds
are spent, would you give more money to
Professor Lytgens’ quitting smoking course/
[anti-smoking pill] (operation) or to a new
operation (quitting smoking course/anti-smoking
pill) that has very good results? 1 = spend
more money on the quitting smoking course/
anti-smoking pill (operation), 5 = spend more
money on the operation (quitting smoking course/
anti-smoking pill)
Explanatory variables
Certainty of attribution
– How certain are you that fewer people will die
because of this quitting smoking course/[anti-
smoking pill]/operation developed by Professor
Lytgens? 1 = very uncertain, 5 = very certain
– Professor Lytgens and his team are the persons who
save people’s lives in this case. 1 = disagree,
5 = completely agree
Urgency
– To what extent do you think it is necessary that the
new quitting smoking course/[anti-smoking pill]/
operation be offered to people? 1 = not necessary
at all, 5 = very necessary
– To what extent do you think it is necessary to
develop a quitting smoking course/[anti-smoking
pill]/operation that will save people that would
otherwise die of lung cancer? 1 = not necessary at
all, 5 = very necessary
Time interval
– How long will it take before Professor Lytgens’
new quitting smoking course/[anti-smoking pill]/
operation leads to a saved life? 1 = not long,
5 = very long
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Quality of life
– What is, in your opinion, the quality of life of the
people who were saved by Professor Lytgens’ new
quitting smoking course/[anti-smoking pill]/
operation? 1 = very bad, 5 = very good
Proportion of the reference group who profit
– Many people who are treated with Professor
Lytgens’ new quitting smoking course/[anti-smoking
pill]/operation are treated in vain. 1 = completely
disagree, 5 = completely agree
Control question
– To what extent do you find the scenario about
Professor Lytgens realistic? 1 = very unrealistic
5 = very realistic
Demographic characteristics
– Are you male or female? Male - Female
– What is your age? ..................
– What is the highest level of education you have
completed? less than high school - high school –
lower vocational training – higher vocational train-
ing/college - Bachelor’s degree at a university -
Master’s degree or more at a university
Smoking habits
– Do you smoke? Yes - No - I quit smoking
Results
A MANOVA was executed with scenario condition as
the independent variable and the appreciation measures
as dependent variables (see Table 2). The results showed
participants to have significantly greater general ap-
preciation for the treatment intervention than for the
preventive intervention, a difference of .59 on a 5-point scale.
Monetary appreciation was also greater in the treatment sce-
nario condition. Participants in the treatment condition
reported a significantly higher percentage (M= 63%) than
those in the prevention condition (M = 47%) when asked
how much of Lytgens’ intervention should be covered by
health insurance. At the same time, participants in the
prevention condition were more inclined to allocate
money to Lytgens’ intervention than to an alternative
smoking prevention intervention, namely an anti-smoking
public service announcement (PSA), than participants in
the treatment condition.
On the variable operation versus quitting smoking course
(see Concepts and corresponding questionnaire items
under ’Comparison between preventive and treatment
intervention’), data were recoded such that, for both
questionnaires, a score of 1 indicated a preference for
prevention and a score of 5 a preference for treatment. A
one-sample T-test with 3 as a test value on the recoded
item that directly compared the course (prevention) to the
operation (treatment) revealed a preference for the former,
t(80) = −2.16, p = 0.03 (M = 2.68, SD = 1.35).
Mediation analyses
In accordance with the procedures suggested by Baron
and Kenny [24], we investigated if any of the explanatory
variables mediated the effect of the scenario condition
on appreciation measures. For this to be the case, [1] the
scenario condition must account for significant variance
in the appreciation measure; [2] the scenario condition
must yield significant variance in the explanatory variable;
[3] the explanatory variable must, while controlling for
the scenario condition, produce significant variance in
the appreciation measure; and, at the same time, [4] the
significance of the association between the scenario condi-
tion and the appreciation measure must decline. We thus
first conducted six regression analyses with the scenario
condition as the predictor and the appreciation measures
as the dependent variables (step 1). We then conducted
seven separate regression analyses with the scenario
condition as the predictor variable and explanatory
variables (certainty of attribution to intervention [2
items], urgency of intervention [2 items], time interval
Table 2 Multivariate and univariate effects of scenario condition on appreciation measures, means, standard
deviations and range (Study 1)
Range Df F p ηp
2 Mprev. (SD) Mcure (SD)
Multivariate 6.66 6.04 0.000 .36
Univariate
General appreciation scale 1-5 1.71 26.25 0.000 .27 3.18 (.48) 3.77 (.50)
Intention to donate money (amount) 0-.. 1.71 1.52 n.s. .02 1.11 (2.18) 4.51 (16.92)
Compensation by health insurance 1-10 1.71 5.86 0.02 .08 4.71 (2.42) 6.31 (3.22)
Allocation of money in Lytgens’ intervention/nursing homes 1-5 1.71 <1 n.s. .001 2.24 (1.15) 2.31 (.96)
Allocation of money in Lytgens’ intervention/anti-smoking PSAs 1-5 1.71 4.32 0.04 .06 3.29 (1.21) 2.66 (1.39)
Allocation of money in Lytgens’ intervention/alcohol prevention 1-5 1.71 1.40 n.s. .02 2.42 (1.03) 2.74 (1.29)
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for positive effects to manifest, proportion of the reference
group that profits, and quality of life) as dependent vari-
ables (step 2). In the third step, separate linear regression
analyses were run with the explanatory variables that were
significant in step 2 and scenario condition as predictors,
and the appreciation measures that came out of step 1 as
dependent variables.
Table 3 shows that the criteria for step 1 were fulfilled
only by the general appreciation scale, the item on the
percentage health insurance should compensate, and the
item in which participants indicated the degree to which
money should be allocated to Lytgens’ intervention or to
anti-smoking PSAs. The table also shows that the criteria
for step 2 were met by the items urgency to introduce
the method and certainty of attribution (‘Professor Lytgens
is the person who saves lives’). In the step 3 analyses,
we explored the effects of the significant explanatory
variables (urgency to introduce method and certainty of
attribution) on the three appreciation items significant in
step 1 (general appreciation, percentage that health insur-
ance should compensate, money allocation to intervention
or PSAs) while controlling for the scenario condition.
Significant results were found for the urgency to introduce
the method on general appreciation and on the percentage
health insurance should compensate. On both appreciation
measures, the influence of the scenario condition reduced,
but the test for mediation was significant only for general
appreciation, Sobel Z = 2.70, p < .01. In short, these find-
ings show that the effect of scenario condition on general
appreciation is partially mediated by the perceived urgency
to introduce the proposed method.
Realism of scenarios and smoking behavior of participants
The extent to which the scenarios were perceived as
realistic could have influenced the differences found
between the two scenario conditions, as could the
smoking behavior of the participants. To test this, we
first conducted a univariate analysis with scenario
condition as the independent variable and realism of
scenarios as the dependent variable. No significant
difference was found between the two conditions,
F(1,77) = 0.86, p = 0.36. We then conducted a MANOVA
with scenario condition and smoking behavior as inde-
pendent variables, and general appreciation, the amount
of money participants would donate, percentage that
health insurance should compensate, and three questions
on how health insurance should invest funds (intervention
versus increasing personal attention in nursing homes,
PSAs, or school-based alcohol abuse prevention). No main
multivariate effect of smoking behavior was found nor
was a multivariate interaction effect of scenario condition
with smoking behavior found (ps > .49).
Discussion Study 1 and introduction Study 2
This first study demonstrated more general and
monetary appreciation for a treatment intervention than
for a preventive intervention when participants could
not directly compare the interventions. Participants rat-
ing the treatment scenario reported a substantial greater
percentage when asked how much of the intervention
should be covered by health insurance. One exception to
the general finding that treatment is preferred was that,
Table 3 Significant effects of the mediation analyses (Study 1)
Step 1: Effect of scenario condition on appreciation measures
General appreciation scale B = .60, SE = .11, p < .001
Percentage that health insurance should compensate B = .17, SE = .63, p = .01
Allocation of money to Lytgens’ intervention/PSAs B = .60, SE = .30, p = .05
Step 2: Effect of scenario condition on explanatory variables
Urgency to introduce method B = .61, SE = .18, p = .001
Certainty of attribution
(Professor Lytgens is the person who saves lives) B = .77, SE = .23, p = .001
Step 3: Effect of significant explanatory variables on significant
appreciation measures while controlling for scenario condition
General appreciation scale
-Urgency to introduce the method B = .29, SE = .07, p < .001
Percentage that health insurance should compensate
-Urgency to introduce the method B = 2.06, SE = .33, p < .001
Step 4: Effect of scenario condition on significant appreciation
measures while controlling for significant explanatory variables
General appreciation scale B = .41, SE = .12, p = .001
Percentage that health insurance should compensate B = .32, SE = .58, p = n.s.
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compared to participants in the treatment condition,
participants in the preventive condition conveyed a will-
ingness to allocate a relatively greater sum to the proposed
preventive intervention than to anti-smoking PSAs.
Perhaps participants in the prevention condition rea-
soned that the evidence for the proposed preventive
intervention of a quitting smoking course was stronger
than for anti-smoking PSAs, which is in fact just
another preventive activity. In contrast, participants in
the treatment condition, who were not told about the
effective smoking prevention course, may have reasoned
that at least some money should go to smoking preven-
tion, especially given the fact that the expenses of the
proposed lung cancer operation are high.
The mediation analyses suggested that only the urgency
to introduce the proposed method plays a role in explain-
ing differences in appreciation between prevention and
treatment. This is in accordance with earlier research
showing a preference for helping more severely ill patients
[25]. Quite logically, the need to intervene is perceived as
greater when someone is already ill than when someone
is merely at risk for a disease. The other explanatory
variables for either a preference for treatment (i.e., time
interval for positive effects, and proportion that profits)
or a preference for prevention (i.e., quality of life) did
not vary between the two scenario conditions, except
for one of the ‘certainty of attribution’ items.
As expected, the preference for treatment disappeared
when participants were asked to directly compare preven-
tion to treatment interventions. However, it must be
noted that this comparison was made on basis of a simple
question only, with incomplete information about the
option not presented in the scenario (Concepts and
corresponding questionnaire items ‘Comparison between
preventive and treatment intervention’). In fact, the
preventive intervention was valued significantly more
than the treatment intervention and additional analyses
showed that appreciation for the preventive intervention
was actually significantly higher among participants in
the treatment condition (F(1,76) = 7.82, p = 0.01 with
Mprevention = 3.36, SD= 1.16 and Mtreatment = 4.08, SD = 1.11).
This suggests that when people have to choose between
a preventive and a treatment intervention, they prefer
prevention more when they just were presented with
the costs and complexities of a treatment intervention.
Clearly, as previous research has demonstrated, most
people, when allowed to compare, maintain that preven-
tion is better than treatment but when they are merely
presented with one or the other, which is often the case
in real-life situations, treatment is preferred. Given that
preference for prevention is greatest when presented
alongside a treatment intervention, we contend that pref-
erence for prevention can be stimulated by providing
information about the costs and complexities of treatment
interventions and outlining that these cost and complex-
ities of treatment can be prevented.
Although the findings of this study support the idea
that treatment is preferred to prevention in a between-
subjects design, caution should be applied when generaliz-
ing these results. Many preventive methods exist and this
study only presented a quitting smoking course, which is
an intervention rooted in behavioral science. Because the
treatment (an operation) was an intervention rooted in
medical science, differences in appreciation might also be
attributed to a different appreciation of these sciences. So
it is possible that, had our prevention scenario described a
preventive intervention rooted in medical rather than
behavioral science (e.g., drug treatment), other results
could have been produced. As a result, our second
study replicates the first, but rather than proposing a
quitting smoking course as the prevention intervention,
it proposes prevention through an anti-smoking pill.
Study 2
Methods
Participants and design
Similarly to Study 1, the research design was between-sub-
jects with two scenario conditions, namely a ‘treatment
condition’ and a ‘prevention condition’. Background char-
acteristics of participants are presented in Table 1. Chi-
square tests and a t-test (for Age) showed there were
no significant differences in background characteristics
between participants of Study 1 and Study 2 (all p’s > .25),
and also no significant differences in background charac-
teristics of participants between the prevention and the
treatment condition (all p’s > .09).
Procedure
The procedure, scenarios, questionnaires, and data analyses
were identical to those of Study 1 with two exceptions.
First, the questionnaires were not completed by train
passengers but rather online by participants derived from
a database of people who had previously volunteered to
participate in questionnaire studies. Second, the scenario
for the preventive intervention did not describe a quitting
smoking course but rather an ‘anti-smoking pill’ with
identical effectiveness and costs as described in Study
1’s prevention scenario. Cronbach’s alpha of the general
appreciation scale was good (see Concepts and corre-
sponding questionnaire items) but for the monetary ap-
preciation items, the certainty of attribution items, and
the urgency of intervention items, Cronbach’s alphas were,
once again, low (.17, .44, and .55, respectively). We there-
fore analyzed the items separately, as we did in Study 1.
Results
A MANOVA was executed with scenario condition as
the independent variable and the appreciation measures
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as dependent variables (see Table 4). The results showed
participants to have significantly greater general appre-
ciation for the treatment intervention than for the pre-
ventive intervention, a difference of .45 on a 5-point scale.
Monetary appreciation was also greater in the treatment
scenario condition. Participants in the treatment condition
reported a significantly higher percentage (78%) than those
in the prevention condition (56%) when asked how much
of Lytgens’ intervention should be covered by health
insurance. Participants in the prevention condition, com-
pared to the treatment condition, were less inclined to
allocate money to Lytgens’ intervention than to other
prevention interventions, namely to increasing personal
attention for people with incurable diseases in nursing
homes and alcohol abuse prevention in schools. No
univariate effects were found for the intention to donate
money or for the item that asked participants the degree
to which they would rather invest in Lytgens’ intervention
than in anti-smoking PSAs. It is important to note that
the non-parametric test performed to check the results of
the analyses of variance (see endnote a) showed a higher
intention to donate money in the treatment condition
than in the preventive condition, U = 1202.00, p = .01;
Mean rankprevention = 49.95; Mean ranktreatment = 63.53.
A one-sample T-test with 3 as a test value on the
recoded item that compared the anti-smoking pill to the
operation (see Concepts and corresponding questionnaire
items ‘Comparison between preventive and treatment
intervention’) revealed a preference for the preventive
intervention, t(112) = −3.61, p < 0.001 (M = 2.55, SD = 1.33).
Mediation analyses
Similar to Study 1, we conducted mediation analyses in
accordance with Baron and Kenny [24]. Table 5 shows
that the criteria for Step 1 were fulfilled by the general
appreciation scale, the item on percentage health insur-
ance should compensate, the items in which participants
indicated the degree to which money should be allocated
to Lytgens’ intervention or to increasing personal care in
nursing homes or to alcohol abuse prevention in schools.
The table further shows that the criteria for Step 2 were
met by both urgency of intervention items (urgency to
introduce the method and urgency to develop similar
methods), both certainty of attribution items (‘Professor
Lytgens is the person who saves lives’ and ‘How certain
are you that less people die of lung cancer because of
Professor Lytgen’s pill/operation?’), and the time interval.
In short, participants were more convinced that the treat-
ment intervention is urgent, certain, and has positive
effects in the short term.
In the step 3 analyses, we explored the effects of the
five explanatory variables significant in step 2 on the
four appreciation scales/items significant in step 1 while
controlling for scenario condition. Significant results were
found for urgency to introduce the method and certainty
that mortality will decrease on general appreciation. In
fact, urgency to introduce the method was also significant
for percentage health insurance should compensate and for
the degree to which money should be allocated to Lytgens’
intervention or to nursing homes. On all three appreciation
measures, the influence of scenario condition reduced.
Separate Sobel tests showed this reduction to be signifi-
cant both for urgency to introduce the method, Z = 2.76,
p < .001, and certainty that mortality will decrease,
Z = 2.25, p < .05 on general appreciation. Also, on the
items percentage health insurance should compensate and
money should be allocated to Lytgens’ intervention or to
nursing homes, Sobel tests showed the reduction to be sig-
nificant for urgency to introduce the method, Z = 2.77,
p = .01 and Z = −2.39, p = .02, respectively. In short, the
mediation analyses showed that the effect of scenario
condition on three appreciation scales is partly mediated
by the urgency to introduce the method and that the effect
of scenario condition on general appreciation is also
mediated by the certainty that less people will die of
lung cancer because of the intervention.
Realism of scenarios and smoking behavior of participants
As was the case in Study 1, a univariate analysis was
executed with the scenario condition as the independent
variable and the realism of scenarios as the dependent
variable. No significant difference was found between the
Table 4 Multivariate and univariate effects of scenario condition on appreciation measures in Study 2
Range Df F p ηp
2 Mprev. (SD) Mtreat(SD)
Multivariate 6.104 6.26 0.000 .27
Univariate
General appreciation scale 1-5 1.109 16.17 0.000 .13 3.31 (.66) 3.76 ( .50)
Intention to donate money (amount) 0-.. 1.109 <1 n.s. .000 4.34 (17.32) 4.62 (12.91)
Compensation by health insurance 1-10 1.109 17.27 0.000 .14 5.62 (2.90) 7.82 (2.53)
Allocation of money in Lytgens’ intervention/nursing homes 1-5 1.109 14.76 0.000 .12 3.93 (.89) 3.15 (1.08)
Allocation of money in Lytgens’ intervention/anti-smoking PSAs 1-5 1.109 1.07 n.s. .01 3.05 (1.18) 2.79 (1.33)
Allocation of money in Lytgens’ intervention/alcohol prevention 1-5 1.109 6.2 0.01 .05 3.70 (1.02) 3.14 (1.19)
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two scenario conditions, F(1,110) = 3.17, p = 0.08. However,
given the p-value, we conducted a MANCOVA with
scenario condition as an independent variable, perceived
realism of the scenario as a covariate, and general appreci-
ation, the amount of money participants would donate,
percentage that health insurance should compensate, and
the three questions on how health insurance should invest
funds as dependent variables. The multivariate regression
of the covariate was not significant (p = .32). We then con-
ducted a MANOVA with scenario condition and smoking
behavior as independent variables and the same dependent
variables used in the MANCOVA. No main multivariate
effect of smoking behavior was found nor was a multivari-
ate interaction effect of scenario condition with smoking
behavior found (ps > .20).
Discussion
The results of the two studies presented in this paper
challenge the old adage ‘an ounce of prevention is worth
a pound of cure.’ Both studies showed a preference for
treatment over prevention when participants do not
directly compare one to the other. The main hypothesis
was thus confirmed. On the whole, more general and
monetary appreciation was shown for a treatment inter-
vention than for a preventive intervention that was analo-
gous in terms of the disease in question, the information
on the most important risk factor (smoking), and the costs
per saved life.
In the first study, the scientific domain of the interven-
tions may have differed with the quitting smoking course
being perceived as a behavioral intervention and the op-
eration being seen as a medical intervention. Differences
in appreciation for these two fields of science could have
led to the differences in appreciation for the proposed
preventive and treatment interventions. However, in our
second study, both interventions were medical interven-
tions and still the treatment condition was preferred to
prevention.
We thus conclude that this significantly stronger ap-
preciation for treatment is quite robust. At the same
time, we strongly suggest replicating this study with
other diseases and with other study populations. It also
appears that the preference for treatment is limited to
situations in which one cannot or chooses not to compare
preventive and treatment interventions. In both studies,
when participants compared the intervention they initially
Table 5 Significant effects of the mediation analyses (Study 2)
Step 1: Effect of scenario condition on appreciation measures
General appreciation scale B = .44, SE = .11, p < .001
Percentage that health insurance should compensate B = 2.20, SE = .52, p < .001
Allocation of money to Lytgens’ intervention/nursing home B = −.75, SE = .20, p < .001
Allocation of money to Lytgens’ intervention/alcohol prevention B = −.56, SE = .22, p = .01
Step 2: Effect of scenario condition on explanatory variables
Urgency to introduce method B = .48, SE = .15, p = .002
Urgency to develop similar methods B = .31, SE = .15, p = .04
Certainty of attribution (Professor Lytgens saves lives) B = .84, SE = .19, p < .001
Certainty of attribution (less mortality) B = .42, SE = .16, p = .01.
Time interval B = −.59, SE = .18, p = .002
Step 3: Effect of significant explanatory variables on significant
appreciation measures while controlled for scenario condition
General appreciation scale
-Urgency to introduce the method B = .16, SE = .07, p = .03
-Certainty of less mortality B = .20, SE = .06, p = .002
Percentage that health insurance should compensate
-Urgency to introduce the method B = 1.53, SE = .37, p < .001
Allocation of money to Lytgens’ intervention/nursing homes
-Urgency to introduce the method B = −.34, SE = .15, p = .03
Step 4: Effect of scenario condition on significant appreciation
measures while controlling significant explanatory variables
General appreciation scale B = .16, SE = .10, p = .13
Percentage that health insurance should compensate B = 1.39, SE = .54, p = .01
Allocation of money to Lytgens’ intervention/ nursing homes B = 1.39, SE = .54, p = .01
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read about in the scenario with (a short description of)
the other intervention, thus when they were challenged
to consider other use of resources, their preference
shifted to prevention. This is in line with Corso et al.
[4]. Preference for prevention in these instances appears
to be a matter of momentarily paying lip service to pre-
vention. This is not to say that preference for treatment,
as found in our study, is a better reflection of reality or
that health economic studies should not use comparative
study designs. The present study merely shows that
there are psychological forces at work that undermine
the preference for prevention most people proclaim
when challenged to comparatively assess prevention and
treatment and this is important to recognize as appreci-
ation for prevention or treatment may have far-reaching
consequences for policy-making in general and health
budget allocation in particular.
In our studies, we also endeavored to gain insight
regarding why people prefer treatment to prevention.
Several potential explanations based on a number of
proposed psychological mechanisms were tested. We
explored whether preference for treatment was related
to the fact that treatment has more short term effects,
greater certainty with regard to the attribution of positive
outcomes, a higher proportion of people who profit, and
greater perceived urgency. Following Hsee et al. [12], we
expected that easy to evaluate attributes like urgency
would have a stronger impact on appreciation than more
difficult to evaluate attributes like quality of life. Indeed,
we found that the urgency of the intervention and particu-
larly the urgency to introduce the proposed intervention
(operation, quitting smoking course, or anti-smoking pill)
most consistently explained the preference for treatment
over prevention. In fact, urgency mediated the effect of
the type of intervention on general appreciation in both
the first and the second study in addition to mediating
the effect of the type of intervention on two monetary
appreciation items in the second study. The importance
of urgency in explaining differential appreciation for
prevention and treatment corresponds with the idea that
people are more willing to spend resources on identifiable
individuals than on people who are just statistics [16].
Concrete and identifiable individuals may be expected
to raise more vivid images and more emotions [26] than
‘statistic’ people. These findings are also in line with the
Construal-level Theory of Psychological Distance [27]: the
time delay associated with prevention and the hypothetical
nature of it (two dimensions that according to this theory
promote psychological distance) may lead to a relatively
abstract construal of prevention measures compared to
treatment (that is relatively concrete), and also to more
perceived social distance. The higher perceived social
distance may lead to a low perceived urgency of preven-
tion measures compared to treatment. An interesting line
for future research would be to further investigate whether
differences in perceived psychological distance indeed
lead to differences in appreciation between prevention
and treatment.
Furthermore, our finding that the certainty that an
intervention leads to less mortality mediates the effect of
the type of intervention on general appreciation, as found
in our second study, supports for the work of Tversky and
Kahneman [15] who claim that people prefer relatively
certain positive outcomes to less certain but potentially
more positive outcomes.
In exploring what drives preference for treatment to
prevention, it is important that we not only look at the
variables that predict this preference but also the variables
that do not predict the preference for treatment over
prevention. Our findings showed no support for the
contention that the time interval required for positive
outcomes to manifest and the proportion of the target
group that profits impact preferences for treatment
over prevention. This was surprising given that Read
and Read [13] found a preference for positive outcomes
in the short term and Jenni and Loewenstein [17] found
that the difference in proportion between statistical and
identifiable victims was the main cause for the identifiable
victim effect. However, one possibility is that at least some
of the respondents who read the preventive scenario
understood the question about the proportion of people
treated in vain to mean the proportion people that did not
stop smoking (instead of the proportion that did not profit
from the intervention in terms of dying of lung cancer).
Moreover, in our study, we found that quality of life after
the intervention was similar for both the prevention and
the treatment conditions. Could it be that a life without
smoking is not considered a more positive outcome than a
life after an operation?
One could argue that a limitation of both studies is that
the variation on the prevention-treatment dimension went
hand in hand with variations on other dimensions. For
example, although the costs of a saved life were the same
in both interventions, the costs of treatment (375 vs. 3750
euros), the relative efficacy (1/40 vs. ¼) and the nature
of the intervention (training or pill vs. surgery) differed.
Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility that the
preference for treatment was not caused by a difference
in preference for treatment and prevention per se, but by
differences on these dimensions. The relative influence of
these factors could be disentangled in follow-up studies.
However, we would argue that in real life these differences
are inherent to differences between prevention and treat-
ment: prevention and treatment in general have different
methods, and because prevention is almost by definition
directed at a larger population than treatment, efficacy
tends to be lower and so invested money per person
should also be lower to lead to equal costs of a saved life.
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Conclusions
The results of our study have shown that when asked to
compare and so are triggered to consider other use of
resources, people prefer prevention but when subjective
assessments get a chance, treatment is clearly preferred.
In these instances, treatment is appreciated more in
general and also in terms of how funds should be allo-
cated. The preference for treatment may be related to
the prevention-treatment dimension itself, but also to
variations on other dimensions that are inherently linked
to prevention and treatment (like different efficacy rates
and costs per treatment). The greater appreciation for
treatment appears to be related to the perceived urgency
of the intervention. Of course urgency is greatest when it
is almost too late.
Endnote
aAs assumptions of homogeneity and normality were,
in some instances, violated, we used Mann–Whitney U-
tests to check the results on the appreciation measures.
These findings are only reported when they diverged
from the other analyses (which was only the case on one
variable in Study 2).
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